


Interessante especialmente o discurso de Frank Biscop



Break the Deadlock 2/89

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NEXT STEPS IN EUROPE

In late February the British Peace Assembly hosted a conference on Conventional and Non-Nuclear Disarmament. The conference was held on the eve of the opening of NATO-WTO negotiations on conventional forces in Europe (CFE) and devoted much attention to the prospects for the new talks. Following is the address of Frank Blackaby, former director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, to the closing session of the BPA conference concerning next steps in Europe.

We start from the fact that we have a ridiculous position in Europe. You could say that most of the military deployment in the world is ridiculous, but some is more ridiculous than others. The situation in Europe is totally absurd. Here we have about two thirds of world military expenditure concentrated in this small geographical area. The annual budget if you take both sides together is of the order of 600 billion dollars (it is always a problem with these astronomical figures: a recent article I wrote printed '600 million' and nobody noticed the difference - a thousand-fold difference!).

Six hundred billion is an awful lot of resources to concentrate on the European confrontation.

Another measure is that in the two central states together, West and East Germany, there is about one soldier for every 54 people in the population.

This is ridiculous because Europe is a settled area; the borders are settled. There are no major issues of confrontation and there have not been for 20 years in Europe. Every European nation except Albania signed the Stockholm document, in which they say that they will never use force or the threat of force in their relations and with any other member of the 35 states. Six hundred million is rather more than one needs to deal with the threat from Albania.

So we start from that position, and it is a position recognized as ridiculous not only by peace activists, Jonathan Dean who was the ambassador concerned with the old (MBFR) negotiations has commented on the absurd and disfunctional confrontation. Sir Michael Howard, who as you know is a propagandist, when looking at some of the wargames that are played was asked the question 'What is this war supposed to be about?'

We have an order of magnitude of military confrontation which is totally out of any relationship with the political situation in Europe. New negotiations are starting on 6 March. What are the reasons for thinking that these have more chance than the old ones? Because the old negotiations which went on in Vienna, the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations, failed. They went on for 15 years. They produced a tie with a sword and a ploughshare across it. And that's all. Why did they fail and what are the reasons for thinking that we might get further this time? They failed because in the beginning neither side was keen on success. The Western objective was to keep the Americans in Europe not to reduce the forces, and to produce a structure where there had to be some reductions on the Eastern side before the Americans withdraw. But there were other reasons. They were wholly preoccupied with numbers of troops, which is a very bad measure of military capability. They spent about seven years arguing about the initial data, where the West refused to accept the Warsaw pact figures. They never got very far on verification measures because for most of this period the Soviet Union was opposed to any form of on-site verification. It was an important point that nobody was interested in those negotiations. You read nothing about

them in the papers; it was a non-issue. People were preoccupied, possibly justifiably, with the nuclear confrontation; they were concerned with Vietnam. There was no public pressure of any kind on the politicians to get anywhere.

Now we have a new start, what are the reasons for thinking that we have a bit more chance this time? This is an important question for peace activists because they should always go for areas where there is some chance. There's no great point in spending all one's time banging one's head against thick brick walls; one should pick thin brick walls - and this I think might be a thin brick wall. First of all these new talks have a more sensible objective, they are not primarily concerned with numbers of troops and they are no longer preoccupied with exact parity - which is always a devil of a thing to get in arms control negotiations. The mandate reads that the objective, among other things, is to eliminate the capabilities for surprise attack and for larger-scale offensive operations. That's a very sensible objective and it is one of the achievements of all those who have been working in the field of defensive defence and non-provocative defence that at last governments have bought the idea that what we want to do is not to get an exact balance, which was virtually impossible to get, what we want to do is get a situation in which offensive operations are not possible, where your reductions are concentrated on the offensive part of your weaponry and you can let the defensive part be left alone or indeed if necessary increased. That to start with is a big achievement and that mandate has been agreed. So, we have first a more sensible statement of the objective.

The second main reason for thinking that we are going to get somewhere is the radical change in the Soviet Union's whole approach to arms control and to the deployment on Europe. First of all the old bug bear of verification is no longer a bug bear in arms control negotiations. Indeed, we have more than one example in which the West put forward proposals for verification, going on the old assumption that the Soviet Union would turn them down and the Soviet Union accepted them and suddenly the NATO side realized they were nervous about it. So, we no longer have the situation in which the West is pressing for on-site verification and the Soviet Union is unwilling to accept it. On-site verification is written into the agreed mandate of the new talks. The second change in the Soviet Union is a change in their thinking of their whole structure of military deployment in Europe. For some time now Gorbachev has been saying they will shift to a defensive structure. For a long time the establishment in the West was snuffy about this and said 'Well, we haven't seen any change. The deployment is the same. These are just words.' But now we have the proposals - they are more than proposals, the unilateral undertaking to make substantial changes on the Warsaw pact side over the next two years. And nobody can dismiss these as cosmetic. They are so sizable that even NATO spokesmen aren't able to use that adjective for these decisions. The reduction in the number of tanks is substantial - 5,000 tanks from the central front states; 10,000 in all. Other Warsaw pact countries have joined in further on this tank issue. There are also specific proposals to remove the particular assault battalions equipped with bridge-building equipment, and so on - that is to reduce particularly those troops which are trained for offensive operations. So the talks start with the promise of very substantial unilateral cuts in the Warsaw pact side.

The fear is the total timidity of the NATO side. At the moment NATO is arguing that the new baseline which they will go for in the negotiations is 95 per cent of their existing strength. That is they are only prepared to cut what they've got by 5 per cent. They are concentrating, and this may be acceptable, on particular limited-range

offensive weapons to set up total numbers of what is permitted in the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, with a sub-definition of what should be allowed in the Central part. But their proposals at the moment are ones that would require NATO to do virtually nothing, making essentially cosmetic changes, whereas it would prefer the Warsaw pact side to make very big changes indeed. And this I think is where peace movements can come in; to try to press governments on the Western side to go for a more ambitious target. We have the spokesman for the German SPD suggesting that the baseline should not be 95 per cent of present NATO strength but 50 percent. For that matter, Les Aspin, chairman of the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee has also made the same suggestion that NATO ought to be now more ambitious in its proposals. This I think is one area where we do not want to repeat the tragedy of the last negotiations - 15 years of failure. One of the requirements for success is that people and peace movement activists in particular get themselves engaged with this issue and be prepared to push on this question of what NATO should propose. Political will is a function of public pressure. When politicians think that there is political gain to be made from the agreement, when they think that this will be popular, when they think that they could bring it back to the House and people will applaud - then you will begin to get movement from the negotiations. And this is one reason for arguing that these new Vienna negotiations should not be ignored like the old ones. Another reason is that this is where we are, we are Europeans, this is our responsibility. I am also worried about what the Japanese are doing but there is very little I can do about that. But the European negotiations are here and with us and they are where we live.

There is one other point which I think is important ist that one must also link pressure to get somewhere on conventional weapons with the next move in nuclear disarmament. I would argue that the next move in nuclear disarmament in Europe is to get rid of the tactical nuclear weapons. I don't think there has ever been a good argument for having those weapons, they were produced simply because they could be produced. Nobody has ever worked out any sensible strategy by which they could be used without leading to the destruction of the whole of Europe - which is an argument which was presented long before the conventional negotiations were held. I don't accept the argument which is used that they are needed to off-set the conventional superiority of the Warsaw pact. But if we are beginning to make progress toward removing what are seen as conventional superiority and already the unilateral moves are beginning to do this then even that argument which is left for tactical nuclear weapons disappears. I think the next objective with nuclear weapons - its not the final objective by any means and people maybe unhappy about that - the next objective is at any rate to get them solely for deterrence of nuclear weapon use by other countries, no other function. And that means you do not want, infact you should not have, tactical nuclear weapons; they are warfighting weapons not deterrent weapons. For deterrence you should not have forward based weapons where they are obviously vulnerable, theres always the use-them-or-lose-them dilemma. So linked with this proposal to make progress in conventional arms the next step to press for is to get rid initially of all missiles with ranges from 0-500 kilometres - that is the whole of the artillery shells, the Lance systems. And incidently it is a move which would be again arithmetically directly in the West's favour: the Soviet Union has many more warheads, many more missiles in this category than the NATO side.

I would argue that these are the next steps to push for in Europe. Pressure to make radical suggestions now in conventional disarmament

and suggestions essentially to substantially reduce the number of offensive weapons - tanks in particular, a limit of say 10,000 tanks for the whole of Europe against the present 80,000; a limit on artillery and multiple warhead systems; a limit too on strike aircraft; a limit on armed helicopters, to go for major reductions in permitted numbers of those; and I would add to propose a zone either side of the dividing line in which no offensive weapons at all are permitted. This kind of construction is something which could make offensive operations in Europe impossible.

Finally, also to change the way people are thinking - people are locked into the position that we have to have the Soviet Union as an enemy. I have talked occasionally to schools and have discovered that there are quite a number of children who thought that World War II was fought against the Soviet Union. This is perhaps not surprising after 40 years when the Soviet Union has been the enemy. Recently a fairly eminent Soviet speaker remarked 'We are going to rob you of your enemy!', I'm afraid it is going to be difficult because many people essentially need an enemy. But we need to start people thinking of the possibility of a Europe without an enemy, and it is not a fantasy because we must remember the old enemies of 40 years ago have gone - after all who was the enemy then? Germany. Do we we have huge border constructions and confrontations between France and Germany? We do not. We quite happily change our whole picture. We don't look at the military balance between France and Germany any longer; this is irrelevant. So, the idea that we could have a Europe without an enemy is not a fantasy. Over large areas of Europe this is already the case. Think of the border between Norway and Sweden: supposing they demanded a force-to-space ratio there. There are large numbers of countries which have accepted that within the region the idea of the use of force is off the map of possibilities. And that is an idea which could spread to cover the whole of Europe. So, we need also to change the way of thinking about the European situation; the present structure is not immutable, not a law of nature. We have a chance now to think in the new talks in Vienna that if there is a strong European disarmament movement behind them and behind the reopening of talks on the next step in nuclear weapons to move towards a Europe where use of force is off the map of possibilities, towards a Europe without an enemy where we can divert those vast resources to the genuine threats and problems - to security, environmental problems, the problems of poverty and all the other problems with which the human race in general is faced.

CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT - A PLEA FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTION

The Issue

While East and West are taking the first steps to cut the means of mass destruction and a new climate for disarmament steps is emerging, conventional wars continue between nations or within nations in other parts of the world.

While almost all Warsaw Treaty states have started unilaterally to curb their military arsenals and budgets, NATO seeks to compensate for the INF Treaty, eg. by deploying new conventional weapons. All arms exports which are used for warfare, war threats or as instruments of power in domestic affairs involve almost exclusively one category of weapons: conventional arms.

So far nuclear, biological and chemical weapons have been considered

means of mass destruction. The higher accuracy, greater explosive power and speed, and decreased likelihood of detection of the new generations of conventional weaponry result in devastating consequences when striking such targets as nuclear power plants, large chemical factories or hydro electric power sources. To overcome the policy of deterrence it is necessary to eliminate nuclear, biological and chemical weapons as well as the deterrent character of conventional weapons.

Military doctrines such as the low intensity conflict strategy or military support of economic warfare are mainly based on the use of conventional weapons. It is cheap conventional weapons in the main that play a role in the growing arms production and export to countries of the Third World. Leaving aside nuclear first-strike plans, the deployment of nuclear weapons is officially justified mainly by pointing to the "security" it provides in case of a "failure" of conventional warfare. It is mainly conventional weapons (for domestic use) that are needed to maintain power structures in countries ruled by military dictatorships. The militarization of societies is also based upon conventional weapons.

Most of the world's military spending (80-90%) goes to conventional weapons.

Conventional Arms and International Actions

The following activities could be part of concerted international campaigns/actions:

- campaigns against individuals and mainly conventional arms projects in particular NATO and other Western European countries;
- campaigns of several countries against foreign military presence and in particular foreign military bases;
- national campaigns for conversion, against the various forms of militarization of societies, against phenomena such as "civilian-military defence," against military manoeuvres, low-level flights, etc.
- international and national campaigns against arms exporters

Concerns

Peace movements have some serious concerns about new campaigns for convention disarmament:

- giving priority to (international) campaigns against the conventional arms build-up would "hamper" the implementation of already agreed to and on-going initiatives by drawing on their mobilization potentials, necessitating corrections of decisions, splitting up energies, etc.
- such a new campaign would mean that the peace movement once again is "jumping" from one relevant subject to another. Past experiences show that this is not favourable because it jeopardizes continuity. Such an approach easily gives the impression that if there is no success with one issue, one "jumps" to another.
- regarding campaigns on individual military projects, critics justly claim that the time of single-issue movements is over. However, it seems reasonable to assume that such an approach would be taken with regard to campaigns against conventional arms.

According to these criticisms, for a number of reasons it would not

yet be possible to build an alliance around conventional arms issues which is as broad as the anti-nuclear alliance. But nuclear arms were much more threatening and had to be banned first in any event.

Nuclear weapon-free by the year 2000: What about the conventional arms build-up?

On the other hand, there are grave concerns about what will happen if the peace movement fails to take up the issue of conventional arms. The spirit and logic of the policy of deterrence are also based upon conventional arsenals. If the peace movement fails to include demands for conventional disarmament in its policies, it will disregard one aspect of the deterrence doctrine it strives to overcome.

The obviously deliberate mixture of nuclear and conventional weapons in the form of dual capable weapons systems will make it increasingly risky to concentrate "only" upon nuclear weapons. With its recent unilateral cuts in conventional weapons, socialist countries have put great pressure on NATO to follow suit. This favorable climate must be used. If the peace movement does not act in the coming period for conventional cuts in the West, it will miss a unique historic opportunity.

The movement must respond quickly to the tendency which aims at replacing the nuclear arms spiral by a high-tech conventional one which is equally dangerous, but seems to be less condemnable from an ethical point of view and is not equally considered a global problem. The CSCE negotiations on the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe started in March, 1989. Their success will also depend on relevant international campaigns by the peace movements.

Recent discussions on nuclear-free zones frequently point to the need to "extend" these zones to cover conventional weapons as well. This reflects at least the understanding that some conventional weapons systems - in particular those which are nuclear, chemical and conventional capable - must be withdrawn together with nuclear weapons from such zones or regions. A failure to do so would jeopardize the purpose of the nuclear-free zones: to create more non-military security. Defensive concepts such as "non-offensive defense," "structural incapacity to attack," "civilian-based defence" and "structural non-military capacity for peace," play a more and more important role in discussions on alternative concepts to the deterrence system, on common security as well as in current strategy discussions of the peace movements. It goes without saying that all kinds of conventional arms figure prominently in this context.

Possible consequences

It would indeed not be reasonable to launch a new campaign (on conventional disarmament) based upon the same old, time-honored patterns. New guidelines have to be found which take into consideration both the big changes in the political situation and the peace movement's experience over the past 10 years, its broader alliances and influence. Owing to the complex character of conventional arms, there are too many national features involved - especially when going beyond the CSCE countries - to allow a uniform international campaign on conventional weapons.

Information Pooling and Networking

Similar to existing facilities dealing with nuclear weapon free zones or naval disarmament, ways for a comprehensive and regular exchange of information should be found. This exchange should include the sharing of experience, plans and assessments of basic issues and current developments in campaigns relating to specific conventional arms fields. Information should be shared both at national and international levels. Examples of alternative international data networks on general (peace-net, greenet) and specific issues (for instance on nuclear testing^{relevant}) show one way of creating an international information pool on certain subjects of conventional arms. It goes without saying that the peace movement has to involve active and critical peace researchers in this work on an equal footing.

Such an information pool could of course also be used to share data on relevant campaigns. Whatever future internationally coordinated campaigns for conventional disarmament may be like, this information pool would provide good conditions.

Coordination

Plans for campaigns on conventional arms issues do exist. The question of whether an internationalization of such campaigns is "objectively" appropriate at the very moment, and how peace organizations and movements can use these campaigns "subjectively" in their practice. The point is not gathering everyone together under one umbrella, which would mean disregarding the local conditions and direct involvement. Internationalization means coordinating plans for campaigns internationally. This could be done with regard to their contents, eg, something around the conventional arms negotiations in Vienna, or with regards to dates, that is, having simultaneous actions in various countries under the general theme "for conventional disarmament" but around issues of concern in a given country.

Negotiations: Monitor and Intervene

One conclusion drawn from the way the INF Treaty was brought about should be that peace movements must intervene more frequently in such negotiating processes. To make it quite clear: failure comes automatically if peace movements stick to a routine of just criticizing government out of bad experience while not being active in trying to gain direct influence on such diplomacy at as many levels as possible. By the way, hailing everything that may be a first sign of government diplomacy for disarmament would be another alternative that does not work.

One way of taking a different approach is the following:

-Peace movements and organizations should not only follow arms negotiations closely and assess them critically, but based upon such assessments formulate concrete demands to be submitted to diplomats/negotiators. Along with that, pressure should be put on one's government in connection with its attitude towards these negotiations. Let us take the example of the Vienna OSCE Talks on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

1. Peace movements have to actively monitor the talks. This, of

course, requires international coordination of interested peace organizations and the formation of peace movement experts who are able to assess the negotiating process.

2. After a while, national peace organizations, having gathered the necessary expertise, may have the opportunity of taking issue with "their" delegations about certain demands and/or approaches. This is most important because such delegations often think they could more or less ignore the outside world as they are isolated from any pressure in their countries and again isolated by diplomatic language and practices. Peace movements have always focused on doing something in public. Why not here.

3. On the basis of a development outlined above, why could there not be a long-time demand that peace movement join the negotiations, perhaps at first through an NGO observer status?

International Projects

Certain aspects, such as the arms export issue, are per se suitable for international campaigns. Promising beginnings have been made by some smaller international organizations and by national movements. A new form of campaigning would be a much stronger international emphasis on certain projects in order to put more effective pressure on specific things. Success is not ensured if an issue like arms exports is just addressed generally. One example is the FRG's exports of submarines. Here one could develop a joint project including concrete actions, together with peace and solidarity organizations in those countries where the submarines or the prerequisite parts are delivered to a certain country. Another example is the Single European Market planned for 1992 and the agreement already made by 13 NATO countries as to the establishment of a common European arms market. This clearly requires a joint approach by the peace movements in these countries.

What is the purpose of this paper

The ideas given above are meant as a contribution to the discussion that goes back to a WPC decision of 1st November to initiate campaigns for conventional disarmament. A decision alone will of course have no effect whatsoever. Nor can an international peace organization simply launch a campaign from the top (which was not intended in this case). Hence this plea is also a call to think of what may be feasible. That is why any further practice-oriented contributions to the discussion are most welcome.

A final remark: For reasons of space and time, the debate about making military doctrines defensive and particularly about "non-offensive defense" and common security has not been considered in this paper.

Tobias Damjanov-Thomas

NATO NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION

NATO is currently considering a package proposal on the modernization of its short-range nuclear missile force. Also called tactical or battlefield weapons, short range missiles have a range of less than 500 kilometers and do not fall under the auspices of the INF

Treaty. "Modernizing" such weaponry was first called for in the early 1970s by James Schlesinger, then US Secretary of Defense, and further developed during the Carter Administration. The plan was formally initiated at a meeting in Montebello, Quebec in October, 1983 and has come to be generally called the "Roger's Plan" after the retired former Supreme Commander of NATO, General Bernard Rogers, who greatly developed it. It included phasing out a whole series of older weapons, both conventional and nuclear capable, and replacing them with a smaller number of much more technically sophisticated and infinitely more deadly short range weapons.

According to an article by Jesse James in the December, 1988 edition of Arms Control Today despite frequent criticisms of the utility of tactical nuclear weapons, as many as 6,000-7,000 warheads have been deployed in Europe since the 1950s as part of NATO's initial post-war strategy of challenging Warsaw Pact conventional military superiority with nuclear weapons. With the Montebello decision, the NATO tactical nuclear stockpile will drop to approximately 4,600 warheads. h.s.

Unfortunately, despite appearances, there is nothing to cheer about in the Montebello decision. Rather than signalling a further opening in the disarmament process, it is a precursor of a new and more dangerous stage of the arms race as it enters a stage of extraordinarily developed technologies of death. Some of the missiles (the Nike-Hercules, the Honest John) have long been criticized as old and obsolete, had been slated for removal for almost a decade. The "serious shortcomings" of 155mm and 203mm nuclear artillery shells, the most numerous and widely dispersed of the short range nuclear forces made them candidates for reduction as well as modernization.

"Improving" short range nuclear weaponry entailed "more accurate systems and more lethal effects from lower yields," including enhanced radiation weapons, or as they are more commonly known today, "neutron bombs." While the Carter Administration had to cancel the production of neutron bombs in face of popular opposition, in 1981, the Reagan Administration picked up the earlier initiative and began production of the enhanced-radiation warheads for the new 203 mm artillery shells. These enhanced-radiation weapons have, until now, been stored in the USA.

Status of Modernization Plans

Artillery-fired atomic weapons. Two hundred new fission-yield 203 mm shells have been produced and deployed in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) since 1986. More new 155mm shells are scheduled for deployment in late 1989 or early 1990. The range will be extended through rocket assistance to 24 kilometers and the yield up to two kilotons, will equal that of the 203mm. Former US Secretary of Defence Frank Carlucci stated in a 1988 report that the Pentagon would seek legislation to remove the production ceiling on the new shells of 925 total for both shells set in 1984.

Follow-on to Lance. The Lance missiles deployed in Europe are scheduled to be replaced by a new "follow-on missile in the mid 1990s. In addition to increased survivability and accuracy, the new missile will have range of at least 250 kilometers compared to the 115 kilometers of the current Lance. Some analysts speculate that the range might be extended to just below the 500 kilometer threshold under the INF Treaty. While no final decision has been made on the exact weapon system, one called the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) is being proposed. ATACMS is currently being developed as a conventionally armed ballistic missile for deep strikes against Warsaw

Pact targets . Although the system cannot be given a nuclear capability because of the congressional restriction, the 1988 Defense Authorization Act made funds available for a study of the military utility and cost of a nuclear warhead option.

Tactical Stand-Off Missile The Defense Department is also exploring a tactical stand-off missile (TASM) to replace gravity bombs on U.S. and NATO aircraft. "Stand -off" missiles are fired from aircraft at some distance from the target to decrease aircraft attrition against heavily defended targets. While TASM's range is expected to be 250-400 kilometers, when combined with various dual-capable aircraft it will have an effective operational range of as much as 2,800 kilometers.

Dual-Capable Aircraft and Nuclear Bombs. Newer models of the F-16 and F-15 fighter-attack aircraft will continue to replace older aircraft in allied air forces.

NATO IN CANADA

Strange as it might seem given their remoteness from Europe and the scene of NATO-Warsaw Pact tensions, Native peoples in Canada have a beef with NATO that is growing with intensity with each low-level overflight of the Atlantic alliance's new fighter jets over northeastern Canada.

Furthermore it appears the situation will get worse for the INnu before it gets better. An article in the Canadian Tribune of 3 April, 1989 by Paul Ogresko points out that Goose Bay, Labrador in Canada is in a bidding war with Konya, Turkey as the site for the future NATO Tactical Fighte Weapons Training Centre (TFWC). Currently the Goose Bay air base is the home for elements of the Royal Canadian Air Force, the United States Air Force, the British Royal Air Force, West Germany's Luftwaffe and the Royal Netherlands Air Force. It is the centre for "Western Vortex", the code name for the Operational Low Flying (OLF) programme that has been conducted annually from the Goose Bay base since 1985.

With the ever-present Western European peace movement breathing down their back and with a growing record of accidents there as well, NATO strategists have been forced to look for a more remote corner of the earth to conduct their jet-fighter tests than the densely populated and industrially concentrated regions of Western Europe.

Labrador is more what NATO has in mind. Wing Commander Ray Hollett, Canadian Royal Air Force (RAF) in charge of Goose Bay boasts that the area offers "the best low flying training in the world." The increase in activities at Goose Bay certainly indicates NATO's interest in the sight. In 1988, the Luftwaffe alone conducted 4,000 sorties during the "season" which runs from mid-April to November while the Dutch flew more than 1,400 sorties in the same year. The Italians are coming in 1989 for the first time with four nuclear-capable Tornado jets. There will be an increase in the West German contingent this year and for the first time four Turkish F-16s will participate in tests at Goose Bay as well.

The British with their Tornedo aircraft and the Dutch with their F-16s, capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear weapons, have conducted simulated nuclear strikes and there is every likelihood this aspect of the base's program will expand.

SOVIETS MOVE TOWARD NON-OFFENSIVE DEFENCE

Writing in the March 13 issue of Pravda, Soviet General Mikhail Moiseyev, Chief of the General Staff and First Deputy Minister of Defence of the USSR describes some of the ideas developing in the Soviet military concerning non-offensive defense.

Moiseyev lays out what he sees the principle of "defensive sufficiency" meaning in practice:

"^{imparting} imparting a non-offensive structure to them; maximal limitation of attack systems in their general composition; changes in the peace-time deployment of troops with a view of fulfilling strictly defensive missions; lowering the parameters of mobilization deployment of the Armed Forces, as well as the volume of military production:"

He points out these are not simply preliminary outlines for the future and that part of the measures which could be taken unilaterally without doing damage to the defence already being implemented in the USSR. He admits that these changes will not take place "all at one stroke" because the reorganization takes time and requires a thorough analysis of the external circumstances.

He mentions the steps already taken which impart specifically expressed defensive features to Soviet military doctrine:

*in 1989-1990 the Armed Forces of the USSR will be reduced by 500,000 men - some 12% of their numerical strength. As applied to Europe, the Soviet troops in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and in the European part of the USSR are to be reduced by a total of 240,000 men, 10,000 tanks, 9,500 artillery systems and 820 combat airplanes. Of the 10,000 tanks, 5,000 will be eliminated, while the others will be turned into prime movers for civilian purposes and simulators. The military budget will be cut by 14.2% and the output of armaments and military equipment by 19.5%

*Parallel with the large-scale reduction of the Armed Forces, their structure is changing. Specifically, the number of military districts and armies diminishes. The number of the all-arms divisions is to be nearly halved. The correlation between the offensive and defensive weapons is being revised, and the groupings of troops and naval forces are being specified.

*The Soviet Union will withdraw, for subsequent disbandment, six tank divisions from the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The combined divisions, remaining on allied territory, shall undergo defense oriented restructuring, with large numbers of tanks pruned (40% from motorized rifle divisions and 20% for tank divisions). Altogether 5,300 up-to-date tanks shall be withdrawn from the Soviet contingent. A number of strike aircraft, assault, river crossing craft and other units shall be relocated with weapons and combat technology, from the zone where WTO and NATO troops are in direct contact. Tactical nuclear weapons are included in the combat hardware scheduled for withdrawal from Central Europe. According to Moiseyev the Soviet Union will not modernize its tactical nuclear missiles nor replace outdated systems with SS-21 missiles.

DANISH SOCIAL DEMOCRATS OPPOSE NATO MODERNIZATION

Karsten Voigt, a representative of the Danish Social Democratic Party and Hans-Jochen Vogel, chair of the Social Democratic Party of

the Federal Republic of Germany returned to Europe from the USA where they met with US President George Bush and Secretary of State James Baker. According to Voigt speaking to a conference in Copenhagen on 9 April, he was under the impression that the the US considers the modernization of battlefield nuclear weapons as being a closed question, the decision to move ahead having been taken in Montebello Quebec in the fall of 1983. Voigt commented that such an approach would amount to making decisions over the heads of German and Danish citizens." Voigt was critical of NATO's offer on conventional disarmament in the Vienna talks as insufficient if they were only going to eliminate 10% of NATO's forces compared with 20-40% of the Warsaw Pact forces. "The East is being forced to change their military strategy and I am not against that," he said, "but we must change our strategy as well. If we cut NATO's forces between 50-75% of today's levels, we will have to give up the "flexible response" strategy."

Other experts at the conference were Sverre Lodgaard, director of the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo, Admiral Elmar Schmahling from the Federal Republic of Germany and Manfred Muller from the SED of the German Democratic Republic. All of the speakers agreed that changed situation in the Soviet Union with Gorbachev's disarmament initiatives had quickly created a new international situation where the doctrines of fear, escalation and retaliation can be replaced by common security and non-defensive defense at a radically lower level, if the West will do so. Source: Land og Folk. 11 April.

SOVIET ON VIENNA TALKS

Oleg Grinevsky, Soviet leader of the USSR delegation to the Vienna and Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) talks said that the talks got off to a vigorous start.

Speaking of the common ground of the various parties he stated:

-both the Warsaw Pact and NATO attach priority to cuts in the classes of arms which could be used to mount a surprise attack or conduct large-scale offensive operations.

-they are prepared to reduce such arms to equal levels, below their lowest levels at present.

-both sides declare an intention to avoid ^{sterile} barren debates on numbers, which have previously deadlocked negotiations on the reduction of conventional armed forces and armaments in Central Europe.

-they agree on the need for stringent international verification, including on-sight inspections.

On the other hand points of divergence continue on the following:
-NATO proposals for limiting cuts to tanks, artillery and infantry fighting vehicles, while sidestepping the issue of troops, frontline (tactical) warplanes and combat helicopters as being "obviously not enough" to remove the risk of a surprise attack in Europe.

-NATO's approach to scaling ^{down} weapons in individual European ^{regions} in particular in Central Europe, is likewise ^{causing} "causing concern" to the Soviet diplomat. Source: Tass. 29 March.

INDIAN MISSILE

Indian scientists are preparing to test a ballistic missile that would vastly enhance the country's military and political power, Indian and Western military experts say. Western specialists said the

missile, called the Agni, would have a range of 2,400 kilometers (1,500 miles) and a payload of one ton. If successful, India would become one of a small group of countries to have such a capability along with the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, China and Israel. Israel has tested the Jericho-2 missile with an estimated range of 1,450 kilometers. Saudi Arabia bought the DF-3 missile with a range of 1,900 kilometers from China. Some Third World countries have developed or bought shorter range missiles. Those nations include Syria, Iran, Iraq and Egypt. Source: International Herald Tribune. 4 April, 1989.

ANOTHER SOVIET REDUCTION

When Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and met Finnish Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Pertti Paasio of Finland on 28 March in Moscow, the Soviet diplomat told his Finnish counterpart that as part of their unilateral military cuts, the Soviet Union will reduce its military in the Leningrad military district bordering on Finland and the Northern Fleet by a total of some 20,000 men. In addition, 700 tanks have been withdrawn from the Northern European part of the USSR and there are currently no major tank units there. Source: Pravda, March 29.

SOVIET CONVERSION EFFORT

Colonel Victor Makarov signed the act on assigning the military barracks in the Leningrad Region to the Garant Soviet-US cooperative for the purpose of making a children's clothing factory of it. The transaction coincided in time with the resolution of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on reducing the Soviet armed forces and military expenditures in 1989-1990. The cooperative has two American millionaire partners: Wesley Bilson and Harold Willenc, who proposed aid to Soviet consumer goods production cooperatives in the Argumenti and Fakty weekly not long ago. They got three thousand letters in response. Attracted by the idea of reconverting a military project into a civilian enterprise, they selected the Garant. It will produce children's clothes that will sell at state prices. Part of the produce will be sent to orphanages. APN. March 28

